Friday, June 7, 2019
Judgment and the Self Essay Example for Free
Judgment and the Self EssayWhat upsets people is not things themselves save their judgments about the things. For example, decease is nothing dreadful (or else it would have appe atomic number 18d dreadful to Socrates), but instead the judgment about death that it is dreadfulthat is what is dreadful. So when we are queer or upset or distressed, let us never blame some one and only(a) or something else but rather ourselves, that is, our own judgments. -Epictetus To say dread is an interior phenomenon is to trample toward tautology, dread wrenches your innards. Here however, there seems to be something to the echo of Epictetus.Of course the crux lies in the gap that opens this passage, the gap between things and our judgments of them or, perhaps more pointedly, in the neighbourhood of judgment. This distinction already clarifies some ground of Epictetus standing. He is not a materialist for judgments hold the higher weight. The term judgment is a tricky point in the exegesis. If it stands for appearance in the sense of a soulfulnesss particular appropriation of sense-data or some basic human body of interacting in the world, we are in a more limited position in controlling our judgments. If it stands for opinion we have some more flexibility.If we limit ourselves to the example of the passage Epictetus is shown to be public speaking in the latter sense at the level of opinions and events which are already complex entities of consciousness. This would follow the philanthropic drive of Socratic philosophy which Epictetus evokes. His position is about stoic while he does not occlude the passions (When we are thwarted or upset or distressed) he does rein them in on a lower floor self control. For Epictetus this takes a very rational progress to, indeed he nearly equates the self with the judgments it produces saying, Ourselves, that is, our own judgments. His argument follows from his position. The events that will overtake you in life are simply as t hey are (we hear this in the other passage of his). One is cast into the world but the impact of events jakes be resolved by the subject. It is ones own responsibility how one responds to life situations. It is important in the analysis of Epictetus argument to display it properly. Looking at it in syllogistic form we find a fault line. Firstly, we note that Epictetus does not give us an overt syllogism. What we have is simply a stick in and a conclusion.There is an implied major(ip) premise that would have the syllogism read as such a) All judgments are the responsibility of the subject. b) judgments upset people not things. c) when one is upset, they are to blame. It is this major premise that does not sit well today. The question is whether we are in control of our judgments. After Kierkegaard, can we really be confident in our ability to commend away dread? I would use example as dread is one translation of the Danish angest on which Kierkegaard wrote his important, Concept of Anxiety.Now for Kierkegaard anxiety opens up the capacity for a response in a way that could please Epictetus but the crucial difference is that it is precisely in universe moved, in being upset, the one is prompted to decide. Or, as Kierkegaard writes analogously in a later pasture, The possibility of this sickness despair is mans advantage over the beast. What amounts to ascent in the drive of despair is not being in it(Kierkegaard, 1989, p. 44-45). This Kierkegaardian understanding of pre-existing trouble rings truer. The trick here is not to lose this issue in mysterious matters.Unfortunately the example used by Epictetus doesnt translate well into analogues. Firstly because death is a experience about which we can solely form a prejudgment (providing that we understand death in terms of Epictetus world where death does not include a possibility of resuscitation). Secondly, because a fear of death seems to be universal. The maxim that all of life is but a preparation for death points to this universality. In order to sidestep some of these difficulties for the heart of the issue it is incumbent to construct a new example.This will be given later on for the purpose of explicating my position. I am inclined to contain not exactly with the Kierkegaardian position of having a disposition toward unease but relatedly that the self is a construct. The self qua self awakens, and this sort of phenomenon can even be seen by the dull-mindedness of developmental psychology. The example is that of a childs judgment. They slavishly follow their impulses toward sweets, for example. They will take them until they are trained to control themselves. Even in this elementary scenario we can see that the judgment precedes the self.As such the self cannot be in control of the self. This way of framing the discussion could set up my position as Einsteinian to Newtonian physics. Newtonian physics are not proven wrong, but shown to cover a certain domain. The field of Ep ictetus is that of an already developed self higher in capacity for self-discipline. This discipline is also the locus of value for this passage for it could be read to suggest that a certain sort of person (or a sufficiently developed person to be less exclusive) can begin engineering their own judgments. In this way one can obstruct oneself from becoming upset.This is a eudemonic ideal that could be manifest in the Epictetus though the passage does not give us quite enough to case that judgment on its own. In the end it could be argued that Epictetus could agree with me if read a certain way (and with no further context in his work), though given his stoic background I am disinclined to this view. Moreover, whether or not he holds this view is of secondary importance. The degree to which he and I agree depends on whether in telling us to blame only ourselves he is prompting us to construct a better self or only if to delineate where the problem comes into play.Doubtless he woul d endorse self refinement but it his intent in this passage is the crucial matter. Beyond that there is only the hurdle that he believes judgment is quite self-possessed where I see the self as constructed in dialogue with many influences (culture, parenting, education, etc) which do much of ones judging especially in earlier stages of development. It is the only hurdle but that is still a sizable leap.ReferencesKierkegaard, Soren. (1989). The Sickness Unto Death. (Alastair Hannay Trans. ). New York Penguin Books USA Inc.. (Original work published 1849).
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